Golan v. Gonzalez and the Changing Balance between the First Amendment, Copyright Protection, and the Rest of the World by Claiborne, Carrie
Denver Law Review 
Volume 86 
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 9 
December 2020 
Golan v. Gonzalez and the Changing Balance between the First 
Amendment, Copyright Protection, and the Rest of the World 
Carrie Claiborne 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Carrie Claiborne, Golan v. Gonzalez and the Changing Balance between the First Amendment, Copyright 
Protection, and the Rest of the World, 86 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1113 (2009). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact 
jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
GOLAN V. GONZALES AND THE CHANGING BALANCE
BETWEEN THE FIRST AMENDMENT, COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION, AND THE REST OF THE WORLD
INTRODUCTION
Copyright lawyers and scholars all over the United States have been
talking about the Tenth Circuit's decision in Golan v. Gonzales.' Law-
rence Golan, a nationally recognized symphony orchestra conductor,
teaches and directs at the University of Denver's Lamont School of Mu-
sic. 2 He, like other plaintiffs in this case, regularly uses works found in
the public domain in the course of his profession, including works
created by foreign composers like Dmitri Shostakovich and Igor Stra-
vinsky.
When Congress passed section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act ("§ 514"),4 things changed for people like Mr. Golan. The
Act restored copyright protection to certain foreign works, which Mr.
Golan and the other plaintiffs were either already using from the public
domain or expecting to be released soon into the public domain. The
restored copyright protection of foreign works required plaintiffs to pay
increased performance, rental and royalty fees, which in some cases were
cost prohibitive.6 For example, before the restored protection, Lawrence
Golan could have purchased the sheet music for the Lamont Symphony
Orchestra to perform Shostakovich's Symphony No. 1 for only $130.
7
After § 514 restored copyright protection to this piece, the cost of renting
the same music for a single performance increased to $495.8
So, why are scholars and lawyers so interested in the Tenth Cir-
cuit's recent decision? For the first time in decades, a federal appeals
court stood in the way of laws that continue to increase copyright protec-
tions.9 Many have been arguing that it is time for the law to check the
1. 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
2. University of Denver Lamont School of Music, Lawrence Golan Biography,
http://www.du.edu/lamonYLawrenceGolanBiography.htnl (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
3. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
4. Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 514, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976-81 (1994) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 104A, 109 (West 2009)).
5. Golan, 501 F.3dat 1182.
6. Id.
7. Brief of Appellant at 17, Golan, 501 F.3d 1179 (No. 05-1259), 2005 WL 2673976.
8. Id.
9. David Nimmer, LexisNexis Expert Commentaries, David Nimmer on the Potential Invali-
dation of Portions of the Copyright Act Based on a Conflict with the First Amendment in Golan v.
Gonzales 2-3 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at LEXIS, 2008 Emerging Issues 908.
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progression of this property right.' As copyright protection increases,
the valuable public domain becomes stagnant." l Because the goal of
copyright protection is progress for the general public, 2 copyright laws
that only protect individual creators no longer serve that purpose. This is
the foundation for the broad claim the plaintiffs asserted in the Tenth
Circuit.'
3
The Golan plaintiffs' most successful argument, one that was ad-
vanced in Eldred v. Ashcroft,'14 posits that there is a boundary for copy-
right protection-a line that Congress cannot cross.15 That boundary is
formed by the "traditional contours of copyright protection.' 6 And the
Golan court recognized that Congress may have crossed the line when it
passed § 514 and restored copyright protection to foreign authors. 17 The
Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the "traditional contours" is at odds with
those of other circuits, including the Ninth and D.C. Circuits.
Many scholars claim this landmark case is a victory for all Ameri-
cans.'1  It is part of a new course for copyright law, balancing the need
for copyright protection with the First Amendment right to free expres-
sion. 19 What complicates this, however, is Congress's reason for passing
§ 514. The statute is a codification of an international agreement with
over 150 nations, and an attempt to harmonize copyright law throughout
the world.2° In the agreement, American lawmakers consented to protect
the works of foreign authors, primarily to secure protections for U.S.
authors in the rest of the world.21 Current technology makes global dis-
semination of information easy and inexpensive. Therefore, copyright
protection is not easily bound by domestic laws.22
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Golan forces courts and lawmakers
to consider and shape more clearly the delicate balance between copy-
10. See, e.g., A Big Victory: Golan v. Gonzales, http://www.lessig.org/blog/2007/09/
a-bigvictory-golan-vgonzales.html (Sept. 5, 2007, 04:05 PST) [hereinafter Lessig].
11. See id.
12. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).
13. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007).
14. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
15. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182, (holding that the lower court must apply First Amendment
scrutiny, because congressional enactment of § 514 altered the traditional contours of copyright
law). Compare id. at 1889 ("[T]he traditional contours of copyright protection include the principle
that works in the public domain remain there and that § 514 transgresses this critical boundary,"),
with Eldred, 537 U.S. at 265 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("In my view, '[t]ext, history, and precedent,'
support both the need to draw lines in general and the need to draw the line here short of [the Copy-
right Term Extension Act]." (first alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
16. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
17. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1195.
18. See e.g., Lessig, supra note 10.
19. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 4.
20. Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *44 (D. Colo.
Apr. 20, 2005).
21. See id.
22. See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, THOMAS COTrER & FRANCIS GURRY, INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 1-2 (2007).
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right protection, First Amendment freedom, and America's relationship
to the rest of the world.23 Now that lower courts must answer new ques-
tions and follow new instructions to apply First Amendment scrutiny to §
514,24 many scholars have and continue to postulate what will and what
should happen. This Comment concludes that, after application of in-
termediate First Amendment scrutiny, the district court should find §
514, when limited to restoration of certain foreign works, is within Con-
gress's lawmaking authority.
Part I of this Comment provides a background on the current status
of copyright law, including recent acts of Congress that are based on
international agreements and cases that have challenged those Acts. Part
II discusses the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Golan v. Gonzales,
which suggests a new direction for copyright law. Finally, Part HII ana-
lyzes the possible implications of Golan and how it should be decided on
remand in district court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Copyright Protection
Core American values inform the fundamental principle that before
any work is protected or privately owned, it is free and accessible to the
public.25 People are free to speak, write, or perform any thoughts, words,
ideas and expressions, regardless of who has already expressed them.26
Therefore, when Congress steps in to grant copyright protection for
someone's expression, it directly infringes on the rights of others to use
27that expression. The grant of protection to one person is, in effect, a
violation of someone else's freedom of expression.28 This concept, first
articulated by Melville B. Nimmer in a 1970 law review article, is the
primary way that the Golan plaintiffs captured the court's attention.29
The federal government's authority to grant a limited monopoly
over a certain expression or collection of ideas comes from the Copyright
Clause of the United States Constitution. 30 Congress utilized this author-
ity when it enacted the 1790 Copyright Act, which granted federal copy-
right protection to a creator, at the time of creation, for a term of fourteen
23. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 3-4.
24. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1196 (10th Cir. 2007).
25. See Golan, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *7-8.
26. See MICHAEL D. BRNHACK, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19E.01 [B] (2008).
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Id. § 19E.01 [A] (citing Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amend-
ment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970)).
30. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
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years, with the option of renewal for twenty-eight possible years of pro-
tection.31
Foreign works were not protected in this 1790 Act. 32 In fact, for-
eign works did not receive any legal copyright protection in the United
States until 189 1.33 Before that time, the United States was known to be
the "chief threat" of piracy in the world.34 Because foreign works were
not protected here, publishing companies in the United States could
choose to publish and sell the works of those creators without permis-
sion.35 Some argued that this unfettered access to foreign works inspired
creativity and progress in the United States and other developing nations,
which benefited all nations in the long term.36 Currently developing na-
tions sit in the same position the United States once held, with more in-
terest in access to ideas than protection of ideas.37 Once the United
States developed, however, it had a greater interest in gaining protection
from other nations. Just as European authors had experienced, American
authors began to see they were "being robbed of the fruits of [their] crea-
tivity, '38 and unfettered access to their works "would discourage [them]
from continuing to create, with resultant loss to [their] own, and other,
countries."
3 9
In 1989, the United States finally joined the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work ("Berne Convention"),
which was initiated in 1886 and now consists of 161 member nations.40
Prior to joining the Berne Convention, the United States only provided
limited protection to foreign works by federal statute, rather than any
international agreement.4 ' The Berne Convention, supplemented by the
TRIPS Agreement, 42 set the international standards for copyright protec-
tion.43 Through these international bodies, international copyright law
sets minimum standards for copyright protection and operates under two
primary principles: (1) national treatment, and (2) most favored nation
31. Graeme W. Austin, Does the Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism?, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 17, 37 (2002) (explaining the Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831)).
32. Id. at 40.
33. Michael Landau, Fitting United States Copyright Law into the International Scheme:
Foreign and Domestic Challenges to Recent Legislation, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 847, 847 (2007).






40. World Intellectual Property Org., Member States, http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2009).
41. Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to
Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 323,326 (2002).
42. The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS Agreement") was a
result of the 1986 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. ABBoTr Er AL., supra note 22, at 3. This
agreement started an important shift in international copyright law, moving it into the trade arena
under the World Trade Organization. Id. at 3-4.
43. See id. at 429.
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treatment.44 Most notably here, the national treatment principle requires
nations to extend the same type of protection to foreign works as it does
to its own authors' works.
45
Until the United States joined the Berne Convention, it was not ob-
ligated to extend protection, nor did it receive protection from member
nations. The agreements allow for some flexibility; each nation main-
tains its own copyright law, agreeing to give that same protection, and
nothing more, to foreign works. 46 International agreements have, how-
ever, influenced domestic American copyright law, creating tension with
the United States Constitution and pushing the bounds of the First
Amendment.47
The courts have interpreted American copyright law to include two
built-in free speech accommodations: (1) the idea/expression dichotomy,
and (2) the fair use defense.48 The first accommodation is that while an
author's unique expression is protected by copyright, his ideas, theories
and facts are "instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of
publication. ' 49 More specifically, copyright law does not protect "any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, prin-
ciple, or discovery .... Second, the fair use defense allows the public
to use the author's expression "for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research ....
Although copyright protection does protect a work's creator, and al-
lows him to be fairly compensated for sale of his creation, courts have
explained that its primary purpose is not for the benefit of the individual
creators, but rather "to promote the progress of science and the useful
arts. In this way, the restriction on free expression is intended to be an
"engine of free expression. 53 That engine is further fueled, theoretical-
ly, by a work's release into the public domain when the copyright term
expires. 54
The value of the public domain is critical to the Golan plaintiffs'
argument because works that enter the public domain no longer belong to
44. Id. at 19.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See Perlmutter, supra note 41, at 324-25; id. at 325-30 (describing the role of international
agreements in American copyright law and the importance of the United States' continued involve-
ment).
48. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
49. Id.
50. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 2009).
51. Id. § 107.
52. Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *7 (D.
Colo. Apr. 20, 2005) (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)).
53. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
54. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007).
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the original creator.55 At the point of entry, they belong to the public.
The public is then free to utilize and even publish those works, fostering
new creativity and general progress.56
B. The Public Domain
According to Black's Law Dictionary, the public domain is defined
as: "[t]he universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected
by intellectual-property rights and are therefore available for anyone to
use without charge.... [and which] can be appropriated by anyone with-
out liability for infringement., 57 This concise definition, however, does
not reflect the dynamic scholarly discussions surrounding the public do-
main. As Professor James Boyle asks: "What is the nature of. . . 'indi-
vidual rights in the public domain?' Who holds them? Indeed, what is
the public domain?
58
Despite the inexactness of the definition of the public domain, it is
highly valued by many as a source of creativity and development.
59
Songs, literary works, symphonic compositions, historic films, and soft-
ware programs in the public domain inspire further creative expression
and ingenuity. 6° When the limited protection of a copyright ends, a work
enters the public domain and takes on new life.61
Many scholars, including the Golan plaintiffs' lawyers, argue that
intellectual property laws have stunted the public domain's growth to the
detriment of the general public and societal progress.62 Others maintain
that the digital age and general accessibility of information necessitate
63greater intellectual property protection. Whether more protection or
greater dissemination of information is the most effective engine for
progress and development is not clear.64 But American laws, mostly in
response to European Union laws and international agreements, have
65
been moving in the direction of greater copyright protection. Two of
the most recent Acts of Congress-the Copyright Term Extension Act
and § 514--reflect that trend.
55. Id. at 1192-93.
56. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33,37-38 (2003).
57. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1265 (8th ed. 2004).
58. Boyle, supra note 56, at 59 (quoting David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44
LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 147, 147 (1981)). Boyle's contemporary, David Lange, explains: "the
term 'public domain' is elastic and inexact. A definition can be but one of many definitions, each
surely a function of perspective and agenda .... " David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463,463 (2003).
59. See, e.g., ABBoTr ET AL., supra note 22, at 6.
60. See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1188, 1193.
61. Id. at 1189.
62. See, e.g., id. at 1194.
63. See e.g., Perlmutter, supra note 41, at 324.
64. See ABBOTr ET AL., supra note 22, at 9.
65. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1-3 (explaining the general progression of copyright laws
leading up to Golan).
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C. Recent Acts of Congress
1. Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA)
Congress passed the "Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act"
("CTEA") on October 27, 1998.66 As the title suggests, the CTEA ex-
tended the term of copyright protection for existing and future works.67
In the two hundred years prior to the CTEA, the term of protection had
increased from the original fourteen years to a term either of life-plus-
fifty-years, or the earlier of seventy-five years from publication or one
hundred years from creation by an unknown author.68 The CTEA added
twenty years to the term of protection, increasing most copyrights to life-
69plus-seventy-years.
Congress approved this extension in response to the European Un-
ion's extension of its copyright protections, to life-plus-seventy-years,
through the European Union Term of Protection Directive.70  Although
Sonny Bono and other artists would have liked to see the term of protec-
tion last even longer,7' many people believed this new term came awfully
72
close to violating the Copyright Clause's "limited Times" provision.
The Golan plaintiffs challenged Congress's authority to extend copyright
terms in the CTEA, as well as the constitutionality of the next act-
Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
73
2. Section 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
President Bill Clinton signed the Uruguay Round Agreements Act
("URAA") into law on December 8, 1994.74 The Act incorporates for-
eign trade and treaty agreements into American law, and part of the Act
amends United States copyright law in 17 U.S.C. § 104A.75 Specifically,
66. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C.A. § 302 (West 2009)).
67. Id. (extending protection for works created on or after January 1, 1978).
68. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-95 (2003).
69. § 102(b) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2008)).
70. Keith Glaser, Comment, A Tune-Up on the Engine of Free Expression: The Traditional
Contours of Copyright in Golan, 18 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 185, 186 (2007).
71. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 1; see also 144 CONG. REC. H9946, 9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono) ("Actually, Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to
last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the Constitution. I invite all of
you to work with me to strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you
know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for term to last forever less one day. Perhaps the Com-
mittee may look at that next Congress.").
72. The "limited Times" provision explains that copyright protection is intended to be tempo-
rary and last only for a limited amount of time. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Nimmer, supra note 9,
at 2.
73. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007).
74. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 38B: HIGHLIGHTS OF COPYRIGHT AMENDMENTS
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§ 514 restores copyright protection to certain foreign works. 7 6 This sec-
tion automatically restored copyright protection to certain eligible for-
eign works, which were already in the public domain in the United
States." To be eligible, the work must meet four requirements: (1) "[a]t
the time the work was created, at least one author.., must have been a
national or domiciliary of an eligible country .... ;,,7 (2) "[t]he work is
not in the public domain in its source country through expiration of the
term of protection; '79 (3) "[tlhe work is in the public domain in the Unit-
ed States because the work did not comply with formalities imposed at
any time by the U.S. law .... ;,"80 and (4) "[i]f published, the work must
have first been published in an eligible country and must not have been
published in the United States during the 30-day period following its first
publication in that eligible country." 81
Under § 514, the work is treated as if it had never entered the public
domain in the United States, and the copyright term will last for the re-
mainder of the term it should have received! For example, "[a] Chinese
play from 1983 [that has been in the public domain in the United States]
will be protected until December 31 of the seventieth year after the year
in which its author dies. 83 Although all eligible works are automatically
restored, any copyright holder must notify any reliance party of his intent
to enforce the copyright, either directly or indirectly by filing notice with
the United States Copyright Office.84 Additionally, the Act allows for a
12-month grace period, wherein reliance parties may freely continue
utilizing the work. 5
Agreements like the URAA help create uniformity in copyright law
around the world.86 An author's work is protected through his own na-
tion's copyright law, but is only respected in other countries through
agreements like the Uruguay Round Agreements. 87  And, because to-
day's technology allows for quick and cheap access to worldwide
sources of information, it is more important than ever that Congress
76. Carrie Lee, Recent Development, Golan v. Gonzales: Capitalizing on Eldred's Defeat, 16
TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 505,505 (2008).
77. See CIRCuLAR 38B, supra note 74, at 2.
78. Id. Eligible countries are those, other than the United States, which are members of the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the World Trade Organization,
or are subject to a presidential proclamation extending copyright protection based on reciprocal







85. Id. at 3. Reliance parties are businesses or individuals who have relied on the work's
availability in the public domain by using it before enactment of the URAA on December 8, 1994.
Id. at2.
86. ABBor ET AL., supra note 22, at 2-3.
87. See id. at 19.
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question how effective American copyright law would be without inter-
88national agreements.
Section 514 created controversy, because it restored copyright pro-
tection to foreign works that Americans have already accessed through
the public domain.8 9 Likewise, principles of free expression establish
that once a work is in the public domain, it no longer belongs to the cop-
yright holder.90 By allowing the government to take these works out of
the public's hands, the Act deprived the public of something it owned.91
The public's right to the information implicates the First Amendment,
and this agreement, along with the CTEA, inspired litigation challenging
Congress's authority to pass such an act.
92
D. Challenges in the Courts
1. The Supreme Court: Eldred v. Ashcroft
93
In Eldred, individuals and businesses using public domain works
for their products and services challenged Congress's authority to pass
the CTEA. The plaintiffs claimed Congress had no authority to extend
the copyright protection of already existing works, although they did not
challenge Congress's right, under the Copyright Clause, to increase pro-
tection for new and future works.94 The extension of existing copyrights
by twenty years, they argued, violated both the Clause's "limited
Times" 95 provision and the plaintiffs' free speech rights under the First
Amendment.96
The Court held that Congress's passage of the CTEA violated nei-
ther the "limited Times" provision nor the First Amendment free speech
rights of the plaintiffs.97 First, the Court reasoned that text, history, and
precedent all established Congress's power to extend the term of an ex-
isting copyright.98 The Court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that
the extension of twenty years made a term virtually unlimited, and that a
limited copyright must remain "fixed" or unchanged. 99 In fact, the Court
explained, history shows that Congress is empowered to give current
88. See id. at 1.
89. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007) (addressing the plaintiffs' chal-
lenge because the law actually pulls works from the public domain).
90. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 3.
91. See id. at 3-4.
92. Lee, supra note 76, at 506-07.
93. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
94. Id. at 193.
95. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. This term comes from the original Copyright Act of 1790,
declaring that protection would only be for a limited time, rather than permanent or perpetual.
96. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192-93.
97. Id. at 198.
98. Id. at 200-05.
99. Id. at 199-200.
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authors the benefit of future term extensions "so that all under copyright
protection will be governed evenhandedly under the same regime."' °
Next, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the CTEA violated
First Amendment rights, noting that the proximity of the framers' pas-
sage of the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment demonstrates
their compatibility.'0 ' For additional support, the Court pointed out the
two previously mentioned free speech safeguards developed in copyright
law.' O2 Although the Court clarified that copyright laws are not "categor-
ically immune from challenges under the First Amendment," 10 3 it ex-
plained why the Eldred facts did not give rise to First Amendment scru-
tiny.1°4 First, the speech most securely protected by the First Amend-
ment is one's own speech, whereas the plaintiffs in Eldred were asserting
their right to utilize the speech of others. 0 5 Second, the Court found that
passage of the CTEA did not alter "the traditional contours of copyright
protection ... ."'06
What the Court did not say in Eldred is what those "traditional con-
tours" are, and what exactly would constitute an alteration of them. 0 7 To
the legal scholars pushing for more public access and less copyright pro-
tection, this phrase opened a pathway for new legal challenges. Those
challenges, brought in the D.C., Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, started a new
discourse about what the "traditional contours" of copyright law are.
2. The Circuit Courts
a. The D.C. Circuit (2005): Luck's Music Library, Inc. v.
Gonzales'
0 8
In Luck's Music Library, the plaintiffs consisted of a corporation
selling classical orchestral sheet music and a film archivist.' °9 Some
works that the plaintiffs utilized were foreign works in the public do-
main."0 They challenged Congress's passage of § 514, claiming it over-
stepped copyright limitations by removing works from the public do-
main."' The plaintiffs advanced a policy argument that Congress does
not create any incentive for creativity and progress (the goal of the Copy-
100. Id. at 200.
101. Id. at 218-19.
102. Id. at 219; See supra note 48 (explaining the two recognized "free-speech safeguards").
103. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), questioned in Eldred, 537 U.S. at
221.




108. 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005).





right Clause) by removing works from the public domain.1 12 The court
relied on Eldred to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims and held that Congress
does have authority to remove works from the public domain for copy-
right protection.1 13 This decision stands in direct contrast to the Tenth
Circuit's decision, two years later, in Golan.
b. The Ninth Circuit (2007): Kahle v. Gonzales
1 14
In Kahle, the plaintiffs operated an Internet service that offered free
access to films, books, software and other digital information generally
found in the public domain." 5 The plaintiffs claimed the CTEA unne-
cessarily extended copyright protection to these works, specifically alleg-
ing that its "opt-out" system "altered a traditional contour of copyright..
• The court rejected plaintiffs' challenge, based on the Eldred find-
ing that the Act was a valid exercise of Congress's power." 7  The
CTEA's elimination of the renewal requirements, the court asserted, only
brought existing copyright protection "in parity with those of future
works." 18 The court also rejected the plaintiffs' suggestion that First
Amendment scrutiny was required, because here, as in Eldred, the free
speech safeguards of copyright law adequately protected the plaintiffs'
First Amendment interests"19
The decisions in Kahle and Luck's Music Library fell in step with
the deferential trend, which confirmed Congress's broad power to extend
copyright protections. Similarly, the District Court for the District of
Colorado looked to Eldred and the general precedent to affirm Con-
gress's authority to pass both the CTEA and § 514.120
I. THE TENTH CIRCUIT: GOLAN V. GONZALES
12
Lawrence Golan was joined by other plaintiffs including a publish-
ing company, a motion picture distributor, and a film archivist. 2 2 Each
of the plaintiffs relied to some degree on works in the public domain that
were re-protected under § 514.123 Additionally, the CTEA extended the
copyright protection of other works these performers and artists had ex-
pected to find in the public domain. 124 The plaintiffs filed suit against the
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1266.
114. 474 F.3d 665 (9th Cir. 2007).
115. See id. at 666.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 667-68.
118. Id. at 668.
119. Id. at 668-69.
120. Golan v. Gonzales, No. Civ.01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *42-43 (D.
Colo. Apr. 20, 2005)
121. 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007).
122. Id. at 1181.
123. Id. at 1182.
124. Id.
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government in the United States District Court for the District of Colora-
do, claiming that Congress's passage of the URAA and the CTEA was
unconstitutional.1
2 5
A. Procedural Posture-The District Court Decision
The plaintiffs' challenge included three basic claims. 126 First, they
argued that the CTEA's extension of copyright protection from life-plus-
fifty-years to life-plus-seventy-years essentially created a perpetual copy-
right and violated the "limited Times" provision of the Copyright
Clause.127 The district court dismissed this claim based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Eldred and granted the government's motion for
summary judgment.12
8
Second, the plaintiffs argued that Congress exceeded its inherently
limited Copyright Clause power when it passed § 514.129 This limited
power, they argued, does not authorize Congress to remove works from
the public domain. 130 The district court addressed this challenge with a
historical analysis of Congress's Copyright Clause authority. 131 In re-
viewing the Copyright Act of 1790, the 1832 Patent Act, Supreme Court
cases Wheaton v. Peters and Eldred v. Ashcroft, the court concluded that
Congress does have authority to remove works from the public do-
main. 132 The court explained: "that the public domain is indeed public
does not mandate that the threshold across which works pass into it can-
not be traversed in both directions."'
133
To address the plaintiffs' third claim that § 514 violated the plain-
tiffs' First Amendment rights, the court explained that because the works
are still available to the plaintiffs through contract with copyright hold-
ers, the plaintiffs could not accurately claim that their "participation in
speech is prohibited."' 34 The remaining question, then, was whether the
restored copyright protection places too great a burden on the plaintiffs'
free expression of ideas. 135 The court relied on established precedent to
conclude that a First Amendment analysis is not triggered by these legi-
timate limits on free expression of ideas. 36 Thus, the district court found
that Congress did not exceed its Copyright Clause authority nor violate
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1183.
127. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Golan, 501 F.3d at 1185.
128. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1182.
129. Id. at 1186.
130. Id.
131. Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *15-43 (D.
Colo. Apr. 20, 2005).
132. Id. at *42-43.
133. Id. at *9.





the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights in passing § 514, and it granted
summary judgment in favor of the government.
137
B. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion
The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed the plaintiffs'
three claims. 138 The court agreed with the lower court on the first two
claims. 139 The court disagreed, however, with the district court and with
the Ninth and D.C. circuits on whether Congress's removal of works
from the public domain interfered with the plaintiffs' First Amendment
right to free expression, thus triggering First Amendment scrutiny.
140
Although Eldred foreclosed the plaintiffs' challenge to the CTEA, it
created an opening for a First Amendment challenge. 141 The court ex-
plained that even when Congress has not exceeded its Constitutional
authority through the Copyright Clause it must remain within the boun-
daries of other constitutional limits like the First Amendment. 42 Here,
the Golan court used both a functional and historical analysis to discern
whether Congress had overstepped its boundaries by altering "traditional
contours of copyright law.
143
1. Functional Analysis
To get to the meaning of the Eldred Court's phrase, "traditional
contours of copyright law,"' 44 the court first looked to the dictionary to
define "a contour as 'an outline' or 'general form or structure of some-
thing.""145 The court then proceeded with an examination of the proce-
dure or general form of copyright law in America.146 It concluded that
copyright structure is based on the principle that a limited monopoly over
an expression, which attaches at the moment of creation, will encourage
authors, composers, designers, and all types of creators to create and
share their ideas.' 47 The process, therefore, is that a work is first created,
then protected, and finally, after the term of copyright protection expires,
released into the public domain for public benefit.
48
137. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (10th Cir. 2007).
138. Id. at 1183.
139. Id. at 1197.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1184.
142. Id. at 1187.
143. Id. at 1188-89.
144. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
145. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 284
(9th ed. 1984)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1188.
148. Id. at 1189.
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According to this court, § 514 changes the copyright sequence by
adding a fourth step after a work has entered the public domain. 149 This
fourth step, copyright protection after the work has entered the public
domain, alters the ordinary copyright procedure.
50
2. Historical Analysis
The Eldred Court's use of the term "traditional"' 151 prompted an
analysis of copyright law's contours throughout U.S. history. 52 The
court revisited the original Copyright Act of 1790 and the context in
which the framers passed it.' 53 In contrast to the lower court's historical
investigation into whether Congress possessed the authority to take
works out of the public domain, the Tenth Circuit looked at not only
what is allowed, but also what is traditional or customary within copy-
right law.
154
Although it is uncertain whether the original Copyright Act pro-
tected works already in the public domain, various private bills and war-
time acts did restore copyright to works in the public domain. 55 Rather
than demonstrating a tradition of restoring copyright to works in the pub-
lic domain, the court concluded that these special acts of Congress re-
vealed a historical practice of treating works in the public domain as
permanently public. 56 The court explained that "the fact that individuals
were forced to resort to the uncommon tactic of petitioning Congress
demonstrates that this practice was outside the normal practice.
1 57
The court concluded that, both historically and functionally, works
in the public domain are meant to remain in the public domain. 158 Thus,
§ 514 "altered the traditional contours of copyright protection."'' 59 Fol-
lowing the Eldred decision, the court explained that the alteration
prompts a First Amendment analysis.
60
3. First Amendment Analysis
In conducting a First Amendment analysis, the court explained what
the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests were.' 6' Because works in the
public domain belong to the public, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
152. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1189.
153. Id. at 1190.
154. Id. at 1191.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1191-92.
157. Id. at 1191.
158. Id. at 1192.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1192-93.
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had a "right to unrestrained artistic use of these works."162 Although the
works and expressions once belonged to the creator, the creator's limited
monopoly no longer exists. Once protection expires, the court ac-
knowledged that the works or speech belong to the public.' 64 The works'
removal from the public domain then infringes on the public's right to
use the works, thus infringing on its freedom of expression.1 65 In con-
trast to the Eldred plaintiffs, the Golan plaintiffs could claim a right to
protection of their own words, rather than the less-valued right to express
others' words. 66
After establishing that the plaintiffs' had a valid interest in the
works, the court then looked to the Copyright Clause's free speech safe-
guards to determine if those interests were already sufficiently
guarded.167 The court found that the two built-in safeguards did protect
the public's First Amendment rights during the term of the works' copy-
right protection, but did not address the public's interest in works already
released into the public domain.
68
Furthermore, the court found that § 514 did not sufficiently address
the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests. 169 Unlike the CTEA, § 514
does not provide relief from royalties and fees for libraries, restaurants,
and other small businesses.1 70 If § 514 had included protections like
those found in the CTEA, First Amendment scrutiny may be unneces-
sary.'7' However, the court found that § 514's provision of a one-year
grace period for those using the works, as well as its notice requirement,
were not sufficient. 72 Therefore, the court concluded First Amendment
scrutiny must be applied to Congress's passage of § 514. 173
4. Remand to the District Court
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to district court with detailed
instructions. 74 First, on remand, the court must determine if the § 514
restrictions on plaintiffs' free expression are content-based or content-
neutral. 7 5 The court must then apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to
determine whether Congress's passage of § 514 violated plaintiffs' First





167. Id. at 1194.
168. Id. at 1195.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1195-96.
171. See id. at 1195.
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Amendment right to freedom of expression. 176 The district court should
balance the First Amendment implications of the law against the intent of




A. Content-Neutral or Content-Based Restriction?
On remand, the district court will have to determine whether the re-
strictions imposed by § 514 are content-neutral or content-based.178 Con-
tent-based restrictions, which trigger the strictest level of scrutiny, "are
those which 'suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon
speech because of its content."179  Content-neutral restrictions, on the
other hand, serve "purposes unrelated to the content of expression ...
even if [they had] an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but
not others."'' 80  The heart of the question the court must answer is
"whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.'
18'
Under § 514, speakers are restricted from using foreign works that
have fallen into the public domain in the United States, not because of
the works' content, but because of certain procedural failings. 182 Section
514 does not restore protection to works in the public domain created by
American authors or those foreign works previously in the public domain
if their copyright terms had legitimately expired. 83 Thus, the works are
not protected because of their subject matter or because of some disa-
greement the government has with the material being distributed in the
United States. The only element that is remotely content-oriented is the
works' so-called "foreignness."' 84 This, however, should not lead the
court to deem the restrictions as content-based. "Foreignness" relates to
procedural considerations; the subject matter is irrelevant in determining





179. Id. (quoting Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 657
(10th Cir. 2006)).
180. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), quoted in Golan, 501 F.3d at
1196.
181. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
295 (1984)).
182. See CIRCULAR 38B, supra note 74, at 2.
183. See id.
184. Cf Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (explaining that a rule is content-based if it treats works
differently based on their content or substance).
185. See CIRCULAR 38B, supra note 74, at 2.
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B. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny
Therefore, the district court should find § 514 to be a content-
neutral infringement on free speech, and it should apply intermediate
scrutiny. 186 Intermediate scrutiny requires the restrictive law to be "nar-
rowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest" 187 and "leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion. '88 Although courts have interpreted this level of scrutiny different-
ly, intermediate scrutiny is somewhere between strict scrutiny and ra-
tional basis review.
189
Accordingly, the district court must determine if Congress had a
significant governmental interest. Congress's primary purpose in enact-
ing § 514 was to protect American creators by securing their copyrights
throughout the world. 90 Only through some level of agreement with the
other nations in the World Trade Organization could Congress secure
mutual copyright respect for U.S. authors in those countries. 191 Howev-
er, if Congress's interest was nothing more than looking out for Ameri-
can authors' money-making ability, albeit an important goal, it may not
satisfy the first part of the intermediate scrutiny test. 92
If Congress's interest was the public good, it is more likely the court
will deem it significant. 193 As stated above, American copyright law is
not focused on the rights of the individual creators, but rather the broader
concern for the public good.194 If enactment of § 514 meant that authors
would continue to write, experiment, create, and share their ideas
through publication-knowing their works will not be exploited in other
parts of the world-then § 514 serves a greater good than merely au-
thors' rights.195  Notably, the House Committee on Ways and Means
supported § 514 by explaining that its enactment is "vital to our national
interest and to economic growth, job creation, and an improved standard
of living for all Americans.
' 196
186. See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196 (explaining that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate test
for content-neutral restrictions, while not making a conclusion on whether it should be applied);
Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Juri-
sprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 788 (2007).
187. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1196.
188. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); see also Bhagwat,
supra note 186, at 789.
189. Bhagwat, supra note 186, at 788.
190. Lee, supra note 76, at 510.
191. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06 (2003).
192. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293.
193. See Daniel Choi, Recent Development, Golan v. Gonzales: The Stalemate Between the
First Amendment and Copyright Continues, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 219, 238 (2008).
194. Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *8 (D. Colo.
Apr. 20, 2005).
195. See Austin, supra note 31, at 25.
196. H.R. REP. No. 103-826(1), at 16 (1994), quoted in Golan, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at
*45.
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The Committee's support, along with Congress's stated purpose and
the lower court's previous finding, translates into a significant govern-
mental interest. Moreover, it would be difficult to isolate a more narrow
or precise interest, other than one incorporating the international context
of copyright law. 197 Congress's enactment of § 514 and willingness to
negotiate with other nations "enhance[ed] our credibility" in the world
and "[made] the U.S. market [more] inviting, providing incentives to
both nationals and foreigners to create and disseminate their works
here."
198
Additionally, the Supreme Court lent some insight to the weight of
the international context in Eldred when it discussed Congress's authori-
ty to enact the Copyright Term Extension Act.199 The Court explained
that Congress passed the CTEA primarily in response to a European Un-
ion (EU) directive.2° Per the Berne Convention, EU members were di-
rected to "deny this longer term to the works of any non-EU country
whose laws did not secure the same extended term., 20 1 The Court legi-
timized the theory that Congress's broad purpose to promote the progress
of science through copyright law depends upon international copyright
protection. 0 2 Specifically, the Court noted that "[t]he CTEA may also
provide greater incentive for American and other authors to create and
disseminate their work in the United States. 20 3 Consequently, Congress
had two reasons for enacting § 514: (1) to protect the copyrights of
American authors throughout the world, and (2) to promote progress in
the United States. For this reason, the court should find that Congress
had a significant governmental interest in passing § 514.
Next, the court will have to determine if § 514 is narrowly tailored
to achieving the above interests. 204  This step requires determining
whether the restrictive law is not "substantially broader than necessary to
achieve the government's interest. 2 0 5 At the same time, courts have not
gone so far as to say the law need be the "least restrictive means" availa-
ble to achieve a governmental interest.
206
197. See Perlmutter, supra note 41, at 329.
198. Id. at 330.
199. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06 (2003).
200. Id. at 205.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 206.
203. Id. (citing Perlmutter, supra note 41, at 330) (summarizing the persuasive comments of
author and former Associate Register for Policy and International Affairs in the United States Copy-
right Office, Shira Perlmutter).
204. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1196 (10th Cir. 2007) ("A content-neutral restric-
tion must be 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest."' (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
205. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 800; see also Bhagwat, supra note 186, at 789 (discuss-
ing the quoted language).
206. Bhagwat, supra note 186, at 789.
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In order to determine whether the means are overbroad or narrowly-
tailored, the court must evaluate the First Amendment right being in-
fringed.207 In this way, intermediate scrutiny is a type of balancing test,
weighing a private First Amendment right against a social or community
interest advanced by the government. 20 8 The First Amendment right in
this case is freedom of speech.20 9 Although First Amendment protection
is not absolute, free speech is afforded great protection as a fundamental
right in our society. Speech includes valuable forms of expression like
literature, musical compositions, and films.
210
Here, Congress agreed to restore copyright to a relatively specific
segment of works in the public domain-those foreign-created works
that entered the public domain through a procedural failing. Under §
514, rights to such works are taken out of the public's possession and
restored to the copyright owner only for the duration of the original cop-
yright, had they not "mistakenly" entered the public domain. 21 2 This
restriction on speech is quite limited and not overbroad. Because inter-
mediate scrutiny does not require the least restrictive means available, §
514 should be deemed to be narrowly tailored to the government's inter-
est.
Finally, the court will need to determine if § 514 "leave[s] open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.21 3
Here, the court must consider that the privilege to use these works is not
completely removed. The freedom to contract with foreign copyright
holders still exists.21 4 Although this fact does not alleviate the First
Amendment concern altogether, it weighs against a view that § 514
closes off alternative channels of communication. The works, in the
hands of some copyright holders, will be available for a price. For other
works, the copyright will not even be enforced.215 While access to in-
formation may be less widely and freely available, channels of commu-
nication remain open. As a result, the court should find that § 514 satis-
fies First Amendment intermediate scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Last year, the Tenth Circuit made a critically important decision in
Golan v. Gonzales. The Golan court seriously acknowledged the tension
between copyright monopolies and First Amendment freedoms. And the
207. See id. at 788.
208. Id. at 788-89.
209. See Golan, 501 F.3d at 1193.
210. Id.
211. See CIRCULAR 38B, supra note 74, at 2.
212. See id.
213. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
214. Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-B-1854(BNB), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6800, at *48 (D. Colo.
Apr. 20, 2005).
215. See CiRCULAR 38B, supra note 74, at 3.
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Golan plaintiffs achieved a fundamental goal by establishing that First
Amendment boundaries exist in copyright law.216
In addition, the Golan decision has significant international implica-
tions. To influence international copyright law, the United States must
be at the negotiating table with other nations.21 7 If it is not flexible,
America may be forced to withdraw from the international arena of cop-
yright protection. The resulting isolation could expose American crea-
tors to significant exploitation and piracy. 1 8
Two equally important elements-free speech and international re-
lations-weigh heavily against each other in American copyright law.
Up to this point, lawmakers have prioritized international relations and
increased protections for American creators. Going forward, however,
lawmakers will need to seriously consider the role of the public domain
and free speech within copyright law. For their part, courts should re-
quire concrete evidence that increased protection through international
agreements is in fact aiding progress and advancing the public good.
And although, ultimately, § 514 should satisfy intermediate scrutiny,
Golan will be a landmark in setting a new direction for United States
copyright law, and shaping the delicate balance between free expression,
copyright protection, and our relationship to the rest of the world.
Carrie Claiborne*
216. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 6.
217. See Perlmutter, supra note 41, at 325.
218. See id. at 327.
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